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THE CHANGING ATTITUDES IN THE WORLD 
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There has been a change, in recent years, in the reactions of both 
oil producing states and foreign corporations to expropriation. In the 
past, nations which were unable or unwilling to pay prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation often became involved in power struggles 
and other retaliatory measures which were fostered by the foreign corpo-
ration and/or their state of incorporation. 
Today, however, there is a growing realization by many countries 
in the world community and in the foreign corporations themselves, that 
oil producing nations are entitled to take an active part in the control 
and profit of their own resources. This realization plus an understanding 
of the circumstances in which past concession agreements have been 
made are bringing about reforms. The oil producing states and the for-
eign corporations are now more willing to enter peacefully into partici-
pation agreements whereby both play an active role in the production 
and marketing of oil. 
This paper will examine the process of reform, focusing on the ac-
tions of the oil producing states and the rationale for the recent acts of 
expropriation and nationalization. The role international law has played 
and is now playing will also be examined. Finally, the attitudes of the 
states in which the oil companies are incorporated will be analyzed. 
Special attention will be given to the United States. 
I. RECENT ACTS OF NATIONALIZATION 
Among the developing nations, all oil producing states have expro-
priated or nationalized oil production within their territories, negotiated 
or renegotiated "participation" agreements, or revised, or sought to re-
vise, concession agreements. Last February, Libya nationalized the 
local operations of Atlantic Richfield, Texaco and Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia, which together produce nine percent of Libya's daily output of 
two million barrels of oil. 1 It was announced that the American compa-
nies concerned would be compensated for the nationalization of their 
facilities, but the details of these payments have not been forthcoming. 2 
Libyan oil has been developed by many oil companies, mostly Ameri-
can, rather than by a single consortium, as in Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
*Member of the Bar of the State of New York. 
1. TIME, Feb. 25, 1974, at 28. 
2. N.Y. Times, March 20, 1974, at 26, col. 1. 
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In 1971 Libya nationalized the operations of the British Petroleum Com-
pany, Ltd. because Great Britain had supported Iran's ambitions in the 
Persian Gulf. 3 
In June 1973, the Libyan government nationalized Texas Indepen-
dent and Nelson Bunker Hunt, both small American companies, in 
retaliation against continued U.S. support of Israeli occupation of Arab 
territories. In August 1973, Occidental Petroleum Corporation agreed to 
a 51 percent nationalization of its interests in Libya and in September 
Libya nationalized 51 percent of all oil companies within its territories, 4 
including 51 percent of Exxon's wholly-owned Esso Libya. 
Saudi Arabia, in March 1972, acquired a 25 percent share in Ar-
amco, a consortium of four American companies including Exxon, Stan-
dard Oil of California, Texaco and Mobil. Prior to the Saudi expropria-
tion, Exxon, Texaco and Socal held 30 percent respectively and Mobil 
10 percent of the multinational enterprise. The expropriation, however, 
reduced each American company's share to 22.5 percent and 7.5 percent 
respectively. Petromin, Saudi Arabia's national company is the heir to 
Aramco for the estimated reserve of 150 billion barrels. The Saudi Ara-
bian government has contracted to take over 51 percent of Aramco by 
1982. Demands for the acceleration of participation and 100 percent 
control have been made. Currently, Saudi Arabia gets participating oil 
and sells it back to Aramco's partners at 93 percent of the posted price, 
$10.83 per barrel. 
This participation agreement, referred to as the Riyadeh Agreement 
is no longer satisfactory to Saudi Arabia, and as participation agree-
ments change in other oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia will be 
under increasing pressure to demand revision of its current participation 
agreement. As one Aramco official in Saudi Arabia puts it: 
The majors are rapidly gravitating to the point where they will be 
merely buyers of crude oil from the governments of producing areas. 
These governments are going to leave just enough in terms of profits 
to keep the majors operating here. The governments are going to own 
the oil, set the price and get as much money as they can for it. The 
majors are simply going to lose production control outside the United 
States. 5 
Saudi Arabia has agreed to pay $500 million for its 25 percent ownership 
of Aramco. This amount is based on book value, as the oil in the ground 
is owned by the state and not the company. There are political and 
economic reasons for the cutback of production enforced by oil produc-
3. Iran and Libya support different factions in Muscat and Oman. Iran is involved 
in a serious dispute with Iraq, and Iran had occupied Arab islands in the Persian Gulf. 
4. Bus. WEEK, Dec. 15, 1973, at 60. 
5. Id. 
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ing countries. The tax take from Aramco is increased by boosting the 
artificial "posted price" on which corporate taxes are calculated. 
The Kuwait National Petroleum Company operates a refinery, 
markets oil abroad, and may purchase a tanker fleet. Gulf and British 
Petroleum, the two companies holding a joint concession in Kuwait, 
agreed to sell the Kuwait government 25 percent of their interest in 1972, 
and the rest by 1982. Now the firms have agreed to sell a 60 percent 
interest immediately for $112 million and the remainder in six years. 
Quatar wants 60 percent participation with its major crude oil prod-
ucers, including British Petroleum, Shell, Mobil, Exxon and Cie Fran-
caise des Petroles. 6 
Abu Dhabi abrogated a 25 percent agreement this fall. The Iraq 
National Oil Company was established after the government in 1972 
seized almost all the concessions, equipment and pipelines of the Iraq 
Petroleum Co., a consortium which included British Petroleum, Shell, 
Exxon and Mobil. Iraq estimated reserves of 31.5 billion barrels of oil. 
The Iraq National Oil Company now manages exploration and produc-
tion, and it sells some oil to the majors. 
Iran nationalized its petroleum in 1951. The National Iranian Oil 
Co. (N .1.0.C.) controls oil production, pricing and exploration. British 
Petroleum, Gulf and Exxon buy most of the oil produced. Of 5.7 million 
barrels pumped daily, approximately 600,000 barrels go to the N.1.0.C. 
for refining and marketing in Iran. The N.1.0.C. also operates four 
refineries in Iran and has interests in other refineries in India and South 
Africa. There is a growing interest in petrochemicals and chemicals by 
the national company. 
Nigeria produces 2.2 million barrels of crude oil every day. Nigerian 
National Oil Co. (N.N.0.C.) is the state's oil company. The Nigerian 
government has declared its intention to control the petroleum industry 
by 1982 and N.N.O.C. has already bought 35 percent of Shell and Bri-
tish Petroleum. 
The Indonesian state company, Pretamina, receives 42 percent of 
all Indonesian oil produced for sale. Petramina is renegotiating its con-
tracts with foreign concerns in an effort to increase the government's 
share to 60 percent or more. 
The Venezuelan government has declared that it intends to nation-
alize foreign concessions before current agreements expire in 1983. The 
Venezuelan Petroleum Corporation ( CVP) will be the primary developer 
of huge reserves along the Orinoco River. One commentator views the 
situation in Venezuela as follows: 
Nationalization is generally recognized as inevitable, even by the in-
dustry. The essential questions are when and how the companies will 
6. Bus. WEEK, March 2, 1974, at 55. 
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be nationalized and whether there will continue to be a role for them. 7 
The establishment of a two year deadline for working out a "national 
consensus" on nationalization reinforces this view.8 
Algeria, which nationalized its oil and gas industry, is seeking to 
renegotiate its natural gas contracts with its U.S. and European custom-
ers to increase prices. 9 
Nationalization has not been limited to petroleum, but has ex-
tended to other mineral resources as well. In 1967 Chile entered into an 
agreement with Kennecott Copper Corporation to buy 51 percent of its 
equity, and two years later Anaconda agreed to sell 51 percent of its 
equity to Chile. Chile was given the right to purchase the remaining 49 
percent between 1972 and 1981. In 1971, these arrangements were termi-
nated by President Allende's expropriation of the major copper compa-
nies.10 
II. THE REASONS FOR NATIONALIZATION 
On December 21, 1952, the United Nations General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 626 which affirmed the inherent sovereign right of 
peoples to freely use and exploit their natural resources. In the course 
of debate the United States had submitted an amendment to the effect 
that member states should refrain from action contrary to both the 
principles and practice of international law and the provisions of inter-
national agreements. The U.S. proposal was defeated, and the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 626, although the United States, Great 
Britain, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa all voted against 
the Resolution. Interestingly enough, reference to international law is 
made in subsequent resolutions passed by the Assembly. General As-
sembly Resolution 1803 (XVII) was founded on the recommendations of 
the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources cre-
ated by Resolution 1314 (XIII) of December 12, 1958. At least two states 
relied on the United Nations Resolutions in their nationalization of 
mineral and natural resources-Chile, in the case of nationalization of 
the copper industry, 11 and Guatemala, when it took certain real property 
of the United Fruit Company. 
The Resolutions of the General Assembly affirm the propriety and 
7. Howe, Venezuelan Nationalization, N.Y. Times, March 11, 1974, at 43, col. 7. 
8. Goodsell, Venezuela Acts to Nationalize Wealthy Petroleum Industry, Christian 
Science Monitor, March 28, 1974, at 2. 
9. N.Y. Times, March 20, 1974, at 59, col. 6. 
10. Stern, The Judicial and Administrative Procedures Involved in the Chilean Cop-
per Expropriations, 66 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 205, 205-06 (1972). 
11. Vicuna, Some International Law Problems Posed by the Nationalization of the 
Copper Industry in Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711, 711-27 (1973). 
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validity of nationalization which cannot be questioned under applicable 
principles of international law. The principle of compensation is gener-
ally declared when property is taken by the state. The basic issue that 
has been the subject of differing interpretations is: when alien rights are 
involved, does international law place certain restraints on the exercise 
of a state's power? If the taking of property is neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, it does not amount to a denial of justice. Although legal 
writers invoke the argument of discrimination between aliens and na-
tionals, in practice this question does not arise in present day nationali-
zation because the subject is usually a giant foreign corporation of one 
nationality, and the action is directed against the nationals of a particu-
lar foreign state. On the other hand, there are situations of arbitrary acts 
against both nationals and aliens without discrimination, such as the 
agrarian reform acts in East Europe and property taking in the U.S.S.R. 
after 1917. However, some of these measures amounted to confiscation, 
which is beyond the scope of this article. 12 
While international lawyers have engaged themselves in long de-
bates as to the validity of nationalization and a state's sovereign right 
to control its natural resources, few have attempted to ascertain the 
cause of these governmental actions. It was a political scientist, in a 
debate with international lawyers, who elucidated these important is-
sues. Professor Theodore H. Moran, of the Center for International Af-
fairs at Harvard University, stated: 
A company like Anaconda or Kennecott enters a country with ... 
capital, technology, managerial expertise, access to markets - that the 
country lacks. The country needs these resources and must accept 
terms very favorable to the company in order to get them .... So the 
relative balance of power between the host country and the foreign 
investor is initially very much tilted in favor of the foreigner .... To 
argue that I concession agreements I should [last] because of "sanc-
tity of contract" is only to argue that agreements should always be 
frozen in terms very favorable to foreigners . . . .13 
The important role that one company may play in the state is also 
a matter of great significance. The alleged role of ITT in Chile is an 
example. When nationalizing the Suez Canal, President Abdel Nasser 
of Egypt, on July 26, 1956, said: 
I Wlhenever we look behind, we do so to destroy the traces of the 
past, the traces of slavery, exploitation and domination. 
Today, citizens, rights have been restored to their owners. Our 
rights in the Suez Canal have been restored to us after 100 years. 
12. Carlston, Concession A~reements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J. lNT'L L. 260, 274 
(1958). 
13. Moran, The Politics of Economic Nationalism and the Evolution of Concession 
Aweements, 66 PRoc. AM. Soc. lNT'L L. 216, 217-19 (1972). 
6
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 2 [1974], Art. 9
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss2/9
292 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 2:287 
Today, we actually achieve true sovereignty, true dignity and true 
pride. The Suez Canal Company was a state .within a state. It was an 
Egyptian Joint Stock Company, relying on imperialism and its stooges. 
The Suez Canal was built for the sake of Egypt and for its benefit. 
But it was a source of exploitation and the draining of wealth . . . .14 
Many concessions were obtained when countries were under foreign 
occupation, when governments were weak, and when large scale corrup-
tion prevailed. As the people of these countries become educated, as the 
control currently concentrated in the hands of a few leaders diminishes, 
and contact and cooperation with other producers increases, concession 
agreements are reevaluated and revised. Other considerations include 
the policy of the industrialized nations who buy cheap raw materials 
from developing nations and sell high priced industrial goods to them 
in return, and the gross disparity between the level of wages of workers 
in the developing and developed nations. 
Ill. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND EXPROPRIATION 
There are a number of propositions which bring us closer to under-
standing the international law problems of expropriation. We start with 
Hans W. Baade's approach: 
(1) [Alcts in violation of international law are not void under the 
internal law of the actor state; 
(2) lllnternational law does not regulate the "property" side of terri-
torial expropriations, but merely imposes, in appropriate cases, an 
oblipatio to offer monetary compensation; and 
(3) [Tlhe standard remedy for "illegal" expropriation is monetary 
compensation, not restitution. 15 
In 1958 the German courts considered the propriety of Indonesia's 
nationalization of Dutch property. In recognizing the Indonesian de-
crees, the German courts excluded the application of international law 
and refused to review either the constitutionality of foreign nationaliza-
tion decrees, or their legality under international law. Furthermore, the 
German courts would not consider the issues of inadequate compensa-
tion of the former owners, discriminatory treatment, and the public 
policy of Indonesia. The Bremen court rejected the argument of Dutch 
companies that the Indonesian nationalization act was discriminatory 
and contrary to international law because it lacked provisions for com-
14. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM, A DOCUMENTARY PUBLICATION 
28-29 (1956). See also M. FATHALLA, E. KHATIB AND 0. GHOBASHY, THE SUEZ CANAL 9 (Arab 
Information Center, Feb. 1960). 
15. Note, The Validity of Foreign Confiscations: An Addendum, 56 AM. J. lNT'L L. 
504, 504-07 (1962). 
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pensation. 16 The court held that even if the nationalization was contrary 
to international law, it was valid under municipal law. 
In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 17 the United States Su-
preme Court declared that the judicial branch would not examine the 
validity of a foreign, sovereign government's expropriation of property 
within its own territory, even though the complaint alleged that the 
taking violated customary international law. 
Another question focused on by international lawyers was whether 
the municipal legal remedies available to foreigners affected by property 
takings are adequate, and whether the measure of adequacy should be 
based on domestic or international standards. Some international law-
yers maintain that the state must provide foreign claimants effective 
judicial or administrative machinery for the settlement of disputes aris-
ing out of the taking of property. Some concession agreements provide 
for arbitration of disputes while others impose a restraint on nationali-
zation for a period of time. An issue may arise as to the binding effect 
of this limitation on sovereignty. There ar.e very few contracts with this 
type of clause and foreign corporations are not so naive as to believe that 
such a clause will prevent nationalization by a successor regime to the 
one granting the concession. Given the degree of instability of regimes 
in the developing states, this clause does not afford a guarantee against 
nationalization, and if the contract is violated it comes under internal 
law as it is a contract between a state and an individual and not between 
two states. Therefore, it is not subject to international law except in the 
narrow area of international responsibility. 
IV. CASE STUDIES OF ATTITUDES TOWARD 
NATIONALIZATION WITH EMPHASIS ON THE U.S. POSITION 18 
Acts of expropriation prior to 1917 had few international ramifica-
tions. Arbitration, diplomatic intervention or governmental pressure 
were among the methods used in settling controversies between the 
expropriating country and the country of the expropriated national. In 
the pre-1917 days, the ambition of international law was to create equal-
ity in the treatment given to citizens and foreigners. Mexico maintained 
that American nationals could not demand a different standard of treat-
ment than that accorded Mexican nationals, stating that there is, 
in international law, no rule universally accepted in theory nor carried 
16. See Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Before Foreign Courts, 54 AM. 
J. INT'L L. 305, 305-23 (1960). 
17. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). See also Bahia de Nipe-Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, S.A., 197 
F. Supp. 710 (E.D. Va. 1961), aff'd per curiam, 295 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1961). 
18. This section is based on an article by the author in Egyptian Economic and 
Political Review. See Ghobashy, A Case Study of United States Attitude Towards 
Nationalization, EGYPTIAN EcoN. & PoL. REV. 39, 39-42 (1957). 
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out in practice, which makes obligatory the payment of immediate 
compensation, nor even of deferred compensation, for expropriations of 
a general and impersonal character like those which Mexico has carried 
out for the purpose of redistribution of the land. 19 
The desire of Mexico to redistribute its farm lands and to bring its oil 
industry under public control and ownership was a basic policy which 
was considered to be more important than the rights of private foreign 
owners. 20 
During the years 1935-1939 Mexico was the subject of internal and 
external pressure from both Standard Oil Company of New Jersey and 
religious groups who hoped to cause a change in the policy of expropria-
tion. Standard Oil published 13 pamphlets whose titles are of great 
interest when we compare that situation to present day reality. In-
cluded among the publications were: Whose Oil is it?; Diplomatic Pro-
tection; They Took What They Wanted; The Fine Art of Squeezing; 
Empty Promises; The Solution of the Mexican Confiscation; Donald 
Richberg's Story; The Mexican Oil Seizure; Investment and Trade; 
Confiscation or Expropriation?; Present Status of the Mexican Oil; Ex-
propriation 1940: The Reply of Mexico; and Denial of Justice. 
In the Mexican case, Mexico was unable to make payment. But 
Standard Oil did not rest its case on law. It continued to use every 
means to villify the Mexican government. The attitude of the Catholic 
Church coincided with that of the Company, both advocating the depar-
ture from the Good Neighbor Policy. 21 Even the American Ambassador 
in Mexico was attacked as incompetent. Though there was clamor for 
intervention, the U.S. Government took no measures other than strong 
representations and suspension of the silver buying policy. The Admin-
istration withstood the pressure in Congress for intervention. In a note 
of the United States to Mexico of April 3, 1940, it was stated that the 
Government of the United States viewed the legality of an expropriation 
as contingent upon adequate, effective and prompt compensation.22 
While in the case of Mexico, the Governments of the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands pressed the United States for a com-
mon policy on restitution, U.S. Under-Secretary of State Sumner 
Welles, in a conversation with the British Ambassador on February 9, 
19. Department of State Press Release (Aug. 25, 1938) in 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 191, 191-
92 (Supp. 1948). 
20. Support by the Dep't of State of Efforts of American Oil Companies to Reach an 
Agreement with the Mexican Government Regarding their Expropriated Properties, Jan. 
2-Sept. 1, 1940, [1940] 5 FoR. REL. U.S. 976-1029 (1940). 
21. F. RoosEVELT, WANTED: Goon NEIGHBORS 47-48 (National Foreign Trade Council 
Inc., N.Y. 1939). 
22. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Mexican Ambassador, [1940] 5 FoR. 
REL. U.S. 1009, 1009-1013 (1940). 
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1940, disagreed with Britain's position of restoring the properties to its 
former owners. 
IWlhereas the United States in its representation to the Government 
of Mexico had never questioned the legal right of the Mexican Govern-
ment to expropriate properties within its jurisdiction, but it insisted 
that if expropriation were undertaken there was inherent in the exercise 
of such right by Mexico the corresponding obligation to pay prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation for whatever properties that 
might be expropriated .... 23 
A similar view was expressed by the Department of State in a note 
to the government of Guatemala concerning the taking of real property 
of the United Fruit Company: 
Just compensation may be defined as that compensation which ... is 
"prompt," is "adequate," and is "effective" .... 
The obligation of a state imposed by international law to pay just 
or fair compensation at the time of taking of property of foreigners 
cannot be abrogated from the international standpoint by local legisla-
tion. If the contrary were true, states seeking to avoid the necessity of 
making payment for property expropriated from foreign nationals could 
avoid all pecuniary responsibility simply by changing their local law 
24 
The Secretary of State writing to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
Bolivia on May 7, 1937, stated: 
. . . I do very earnestly desire to . . . urge the expression of my sincere 
hope that steps may be taken by the Bolivian Government at an early 
opportunity to make it clear that the Government has every intention 
of offering just and equitable compensation for the properties owned by 
nationals of the United States; ... or, failing an agreement between 
these nationals of the United States and the Government of Bolivia 
upon the form and amount of such compensation, that it will agree 
upon some method of adjudication of the rights and equities inherent.25 
In this case the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey became in-
volved after the seizure of its properties by Bolivia on March 15, 1937, 
following a claim that the company illegally exported a quantity of 
petroleum to Argentina during 1926-27. It also accused the company 
of avoiding payment of income tax. A settlement was eventually made 
on January 27, 1943, in which Bolivia paid Standard Oil of New Jersey 
$1,500,000. 
23. Memorandum of Conversation by the Under-Secretary of State (Welles), [1940] 
5 FOR. REL. U.S. 994, 994-95 (1940). 
24. DEP'T or STATE BULL., Sept. 14, 1953, at 359-60. See also Hyde, Permanent Sover-
eignty Over Natural Wealth and Resources, 50 AM. J. lNT'L L. 854, 864 (1956). 
25. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Minister in Bolivia, [1937] 5 FoR. 
REL. U.S. 284, 285 (1937). 
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In the Spanish nationalization of oil, the United States Government 
did not rest its case on law. The Charge d' Affaires informed the Secre-
tary of State on December 28, 1927 that 
it is obvious that the legal opinions have . . . hardly more than an 
academic value, as the policy of the Spanish dictatorship takes little 
or no account of previously existing Constitution, Civil Code, or even 
of previous Royal Decrees.28 
On February 18, 1928, the Charge d'Affaires informed the Depart-
ment of State that "eminent legal authorities argue that, under existing 
conditions here, testing the royal decree's legality by bringing suit in 
Spanish courts would be impracticable ... although it would 
strengthen diplomatic efforts."27 
The American Ambassador suggested that "it might be better for 
the moment to pass over all the legal technicalities and endeavor to 
reach a practical settlement on business lines."28 When it was apparent 
that the Spanish government would agree to submit the French claims 
to arbitration, the United States felt that it might profit by the French 
initiative. Thus the Secretary of State informed the Charge d'Affaires 
in Spai:n (Whithouse) on February 14, 1929, that: 
. . . The United States has no arbitration treaty with Spain and conse-
quently its position as regards arbitration is less favorable than that 
enjoyed by France. However, it is obvious that should the Spanish 
Government arbitrate the matter with the French Government, this 
Government, in view of the repeated Spanish assurances as to equality 
of treatment, would expect the Spanish Government voluntarily to 
apply the principles established by the arbitration to the valuation and 
payment of the American interests concerned.29 
Sometimes the state possesses a means for exerting pressure on 
another state, thereby influencing the settlement of a dispute. The pos-
session of the United States, in 1948, of $46,800,000 of Yugoslav gold, 
blocked by the United States during the War was used to obtain a 
settlement on American claims arising out of Yugoslav nationalization. 
This also provided the source of payment of settlement. 
In one incident the United States displayed force to protect the 
interest of Edward A. Hopkins in Paraguay. On December 8, 1957, a 
fleet was sent to Paraguay "to obtain redress, forcibly, if necessary." A 
26. Letter from the Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, [1927] 3 FoR. REL. 
U.S. 724, 727 (1927). 
27. Telegram from the Charge in Spain to the Secretary of State, [1928] 3 FoR. REL. 
U.S. 852 (1928). 
28. Id. at 872. 
29. Letter from the Secretary of State to the Charge in Spain, [1929] 3 FoR. REL. 
U.S. 773, 774 (1929). 
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Commissioner was sent with the fleet with instructions to make a pacific 
settlement and to accept $500,000 as a minimum or in the event that 
Paraguay refused, to consent to arbitration. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Acts of nationalization and expropriation are recognized under in-
ternational law. The nationalization acts are matters which are within 
the exclusive, domestic jurisdiction of the producing states. This has 
been established in the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute before the Interna-
tional Court of Justice and the United Nations Security Council. 
Recent nationalizations are always accompanied by an offer to pay 
prompt and adequate compensation. The ability to pay compensation 
is no longer a problem, particularly in the oil producing states. The 
problems arising in Latin America during pre-World War II nationaliza-
tions have almost ceased to exist. Valuation is now accepted at book 
value, and is normally resolved as oil companies accept the fact that the 
oil producing countries own the oil in the ground. Foreign corporations 
are no longer taking strong measures against producing nations. Rather 
than requesting governmental intervention to combat nationalization or 
to obtain greater amounts of compensation, the oil companies recognize 
the inevitability of nationalization and distinguish between participa-
tion agreements and nationalization. The oil companies negotiate with 
the producing states in good faith, on an arms-length basis, to achieve 
participation agreements which are not considered a unilateral abroga-
tion of contracts by producing states but a revision of contracts by 
mutual consent which is valid under both internal and international 
law. Admittedly there is a degree of pressure by the state demanding 
change but we cannot deny the equal pressure of the foreign corpora-
tions and its state of incorporation. Foreign corporations no longer think 
in terms of retaliation, boycott of the expropriated natural resource 
abroad, the use of dirty tricks, or the placing of obstacles in the way of 
the marketing of these products. 
Oil companies are blamed in the state of incorporation for adopting 
these realistic and practical policies, and yielding to the demands of the 
oil producing states. Few realize that they have no alternative and no 
options but to continue to be the buyers and distributors of natural 
resources, leaving production in the hands of these states. If the expro-
priating state fails to provide compensation or machinery for valuation, 
the act may amount to confiscation and may give rise to international 
responsibility. There are few cases in this category. The issue ofarbi-
trary and discriminatory acts no longer arises, although arguments are 
made that nationalization in Libya was accompanied by statements 
that the action was retaliatory in nature against the nationals of a par-
12
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ticular state. While boycott is a legitimate action in relation to harmful 
foreign policies, nationalization has far reaching international and legal 
consequences. Nationalization should be done, as in the case of Chile, 
with all machinery and procedure for compensation and valuation, 
without reference to causes·or political considerations, in order to avoid 
a challenge of its validity or any accusation of a violation of interna-
tional law. 
The expropriating nation must have the ability to manage and 
operate its nationalized industry. While Iran had initially failed and 
Mexico was not completely successful in the managerial field, Iraq, 
Egypt and Algeria were able to place trained personnel in management 
and engineering positions and thereby achieve a degree of success in 
their nationalization actions. The other Arab and Islamic countries will 
draw on each other's resources and manpower. An embargo on technol-
ogy will not curtail expropriation. Recruiting of foreign technicians is 
also possible. The developed countries which embarked on brain drains 
of developing nations are now facing the competition of vast funds in 
the hands of oil producing nations to attract the best available techni-
cians . .Iraq recently induced Arab immigrants who had settled in the 
United States and West Europe to return to the Arab world through the 
use of numerous incentives. 
The oil companies, though admitting the inequities of old conces-
sions and the desirability of their revision, are demanding that some 
guarantee, such as arbitration clauses, be given to the new agreements, 
particularly on the sale and marketing of oil. The oil producing states 
have been reluctant to submit to international arbitration, but they may 
be willing to do so if they are able to control production. The tendency 
is for state-owned corporations and the consuming states to negotiate for 
the purchase of oil in exchange for technical and industrial projects, and 
it may be that some of these new contracts are under international law 
within the purview of the report of the Special Rapporteur of the Inter-
national Law Commission. 30 
30. Amado, (Fourth) Report on International Responsibility, [1959) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. 
CoMM'N 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/119 (1959) and Amado, (Fifth) Report on International 
Responsibility, (1960) 2 Y.B. INT'L L. CoMM'N 41, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/125 (1960). 
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